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In his discussion of Habermas, Foucault, and rhetoric, Kendall Phillips aims to reconstruct a
debate between Jürgen Habermas and Michel Foucault that never materialized. The debate was
to take Kant’s essay “What Is Enlightenment?” as its point of departure. Given this starting
point, one would expect the debate to turn on differing conceptions of public reason and the
public sphere. Phillips, however, identifies the notion of comprehensibility as the deeper point at
issue. Whereas Habermas predicates his discourse theory—and consequently, his normative
model of undistorted communication in the public sphere—on the assumption of mutual
comprehensibility among participants, Foucault’s “ontology of the present” aims to upset just
this assumption. Behind Foucault’s strategy lies the belief that enlightenment constitutes a
never-completed process calling for ongoing, modest experiments in transgression that push the
boundaries of established modes of thought and action. Habermas’s normative model, by
contrast, suggests the possibility of completion—an “enlightened age” that would be secured
through a properly structured and comprehensible public sphere. Phillips then goes on, finally,
to propose rhetoric as the area in which one might find a way to mediate these two opposed
conceptions.
Although I find Phillips’ general characterizations of Habermas and Foucault plausible
enough and am intrigued by his allusions to rhetoric, I’m not sure how much I agree with his
diagnosis. At the least, I would want to make some modifications in his analysis. I do not deny
that mutual comprehensibility is a potentially difficult matter that Habermas moves past rather
quickly in his urge to elaborate norms of public justification. Indeed, he no longer treats
comprehensibility as a validity claim on a par with truth, rightness, and the like, but has demoted
it to a “presupposition of communication” or idealization that language-users suppose is
adequately satisfied when they engage in communicative action (Habermas 1984, 310; 1996, 1112). Moreover, although I am much less familiar with Foucault, Phillips’s reading strikes me as
plausible: Foucault links his critique of modern rationalization with the interrogation of the
coercive structures that arise with sense-making itself (Foucault 1996, 389f). On this view, the
comprehensible is precisely what we should not take for granted.
Nonetheless, for purposes of diagnosing the debate, my initial inclination is to begin by
examining the differing practices of social critique we find in the two thinkers. Here it helps to
distinguish between the standpoint of the critical theorist of the public sphere and that of the
participant in the public sphere. I begin with the theorist’s position, though we shall soon see that
this standpoint is closely related to that of participants.
Habermas and Foucault are both theorists providing us with two different approaches to
critical analysis, which more or less map onto Foucault’s distinction between a formal or analytic
method of critique—the search for “formal structures of universal value,” as we find in Kant-and his own historical ontology of the present, which by the way Foucault also finds in Kant
(Foucault 1984, 46; cf. 1994). As critical theorists, however, Foucault and Habermas must
confront the problematic issue of the position and status of the critical theorist: at least since Karl
Marx, critical theorists have generally attempted to account for the grounds and possibility of
their critique, and they have gotten into trouble precisely when they fail at this task. Foucault in
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particular has been criticized by a number of social theorists for failing to articulate the
normative standpoint for his critique (e.g., McCarthy 1994). Whether this criticism is fair to
Foucault or not (cf. Schmidt and Wartenberg 1994), it illuminates what Habermas is up to when
he attends to the normative bases of critique: he hopes thereby to discharge this burden on the
critical theorist. His attempts to formulate such idealizations as the “ideal speech situation” or
the “unavoidable pragmatic presuppositions of argumentation in general” lie at the heart of his
efforts to ground, and explain the possibility of, his own standpoint as critical theorist. For such
idealizations undergird or explain the idea of a reasonable or undistorted public sphere, one in
which communication and discourse are carried out in such a way as to provide the resources for
a genuinely legitimate democratic politics. Consequently, criticisms of public unreason are
possible from the perspective of—they can appeal to--such idealizations, though these do not
provide unshakeable foundations for critique (here Habermas disagrees with Karl-Otto Apel;
Habermas 1990, 80-86, 95f).
Herein lies a key difference between Foucault and Habermas. Foucault is suspicious of just
such claims about universal structures of public reason. As Phillips construes the issue,
Habermas’s appeal to formal idealizations seem to suggest the idea of a public sphere that could
actually be reasonable, thus an actually “enlightened age.” Indeed, Foucault seems to have read
Habermas as proposing a kind of utopia of “perfectly transparent communication” (see
McCarthy 1994, 265). But Habermas does not intend such a reading, and to avoid it he has
dropped his earlier term “ideal speech situation” (see Habermas 1999, 288f). His formal
idealizations are, rather, an attempt to spell out what we mean by “reasonable” public discussion
as an ongoing process. As idealizations, however, these do not, and could not, describe any
empirically achievable public discussion. Thus for Habermas, too, the public sphere can at most
reflect the process of enlightenment, not its achievement.
That said, Foucault’s suspicions still have a valid point—indeed they warn against an alltoo-easy familiarity with the meaning of “reasonable.” But in the context of a FoucaultHabermas debate, it is important to see exactly how such suspicions properly come into play.
Although Habermas does not consider discursive idealizations to be fully realizable, he also
holds that actual discussions can sometimes “approximate” the kind of reasonableness spelled
out in these idealizations (Habermas 1993, 48-54; 1999, 296f). More precisely: a well-conducted
actual discourse can, at its best, warrant a provisional presumption that we’ve sufficiently
approximated a reasonable discussion. Just as we can take a chalk circle as a sufficiently good
approximation of an ideal circle, so we can gain the sense that our discussion has indeed been
reasonable, so far as we can tell, even though full reasonability is an unachievable idealization
(cf. Habermas, 1993, 54f).
Just this situation, however, poses the danger to which Foucault was so keenly attuned: a
public that takes itself to be reasonable enough for present purposes (i.e., approximately
reasonable), and thus takes itself to sufficiently comprehend its internal structures as legitimate
and legitimating—thus to take itself as “enlightened”—though it in fact is still on the way to
enlightenment. Precisely because normative idealizations cannot be realized as such, even the
best of public discussions contains elements of the ad hoc and contingent. That is, we cannot,
strictly speaking, treat each participant symmetrically, we cannot give equal attention to each
person’s arguments, we cannot weigh arguments in an utterly bias-free manner. Nor can any
formal institutional procedure ensure that we do, for such procedures must always be applied in
the face of circumstantial contingencies that can never be fully anticipated in advance.
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Consequently, it is precisely in those situations in which a public congratulates itself on its
reasonableness, precisely when a group comprehends its discussion as sufficiently approximating
norms of public reason, that Foucault’s critical question makes the most sense: “in what is given
to us as universal, necessary, obligatory, what place is occupied by whatever is singular,
contingent, and the product of arbitrary constraints?” (Foucault 1984, 45).
Notice that, having begun with the theorist’s position, we now find ourselves dealing with
the standpoint of engaged participants in the public sphere, who strive to meet the norms of
public reason articulated by the theorist. The two positions are in fact closely related: after all,
Habermas’s normative-theoretical analysis of the public sphere attempts to articulate the
normative ideas that guide participants in actual discussions. The dangerous presumption that I
have just described--that is, the danger of a public of participants taking their discussions as
reasonable and forgetting the mix of contingencies and biases that still remain—has in effect
been licensed by the normative theory. I say “in effect” because Habermas can of course protest
that the very notion of an idealization should alert us to the fact that shortcomings always inhabit
our most attentive and well-conducted discussions. But perhaps we need more than such
cautionary provisos, both at the theoretical and participant levels. If so, then Foucault might
provide the kind of theoretical corrective, which points in turn to the sorts of practical
experiments in transgression he called for among participants.
In light of the foregoing analysis, Phillips’ remarks on rhetoric as the area in which we
might mediate the opposition between Foucault and Habermas seems on target. Certainly
comprehensibility plays some role in this task, and if we examine the kind of rhetorical theory
that might help us address the opposition between Foucault and Habermas, we can pinpoint this
role. To close then, I make a brief suggestion of the focus such a rhetorical analysis must take.
Although, as Phillips notes, neither thinker has embraced rhetoric, attempts have been made
to elaborate a rhetoric that would be compatible with each thinker’s critical philosophy
(McKerrow 1989; Rehg 1997; Bohman 1988; 1997). Rather than dig into these different
proposals I will merely suggest that, if our concern is with the critique of the public sphere and
democratic politics, then rhetorical analysis informed by both Foucault and Habermas must look
above all to the diverse ways in which rhetoric affects the participants’ shared sense of closure of
discussion. That is, the rhetorical analysis should examine, on the one hand, the various devices
speakers employ to assure their audiences that a given topic has been sufficiently discussed for
us all to agree that the speaker’s solution is in fact the “reasonable” one, the solution that has
gained “the consensus” of anyone who counts as “competent.” Such constructions of consensus
typically go hand-in-hand with the dismissal of remaining objections as unreasonable and
uninformed. On the other hand, rhetorical analysis should also attend to the ways in which
opponents attempt to keep an issue open, or to open up for discussion a topic that has previously
been off the agenda—in a word, the rhetorics of social-political criticism.
Here I think that the notion of comprehensibility does play a key role, though not the only
role. We would expect speakers who aim at closure (even if this closure is only provisional, for
a particular point in time and in view of a pressure to decide a political question) to emphasize
the clarity of the matter and the arguments in favor of the preferred solution. Moreover, we
would expect them to invoke the hallmarks of rational discussion as unproblematic ideals that
have been more or less satisfied. Such speakers might claim, for example, that the discussion
has been “open” and “unrestricted,” that every point of view has been given an “equal” and
“impartial” hearing, and so on—as though these ideals and their application were readily
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comprehensible. Conversely, it is just such assumptions of comprehensibility and fulfillment
that the rhetorics of criticism would aim to upset. However, I am not sure that comprehensibility
should form the main or sole focus of such analysis. Other devices are also available on both
sides of such a discourse of closure and its contestation: for example, the Aristotelian means of
persuasion could, I suspect, be employed both to hasten closure and to impede it.
At the end of the day, however, it remains unclear, at least to me, whether Foucault’s
approach has the resources to address the further question that such rhetorical analyses seem to
leave answered: at the point of political choice, how do participants (or decision makers) sort
through the opposing rhetorics of closure and criticism and determine which side has the better
arguments? To answer this question, it seems to me, we cannot do without a more robust
normative analysis of the sort that Habermas hopes to provide.
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